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Brian Leiter:Marxism and the Continuing Irrelevance of Normative Theory


Copyright(c) 2002 The Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University

StanfordLaw Review, May,2002, 54Stan. L. Rev. 1129

 

LENGTH: 12137 words

 

BOOK REVIEW: Marxism and the ContinuingIrrelevance of Normative Theory If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're SoRich? By G. A. Cohen.

 

 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. 237pp. $ 18.00.

 

NAME: Brian Leiter*

 

BIO: * Charles I. Francis Professor in Law,Professor of Philosophy, and Director of the Law & Philosophy Program, TheUniversity of Texas at Austin; Visiting Professor of Philosophy, UniversityCollege London (third trimester). For stimulating discussion of Cohen's book, Iam grateful to the participants in a reading group at Texas in the fallsemester of 2001-02: Brian Berry (J.D./Ph.D. candidate), Jane Maslow Cohen (lawfaculty), Brent Ritchey (J.D. candidate), Lawrence G. Sager (law faculty),Sahotra Sarkar (philosophy faculty), and Yonit Sharaby (J.D./Ph.D. candidate).Thanks, also, to William Forbath for guidance on Marxist historiography, and toRoberto Gonzalez and Larry Sager for comments on the penultimate draft.

 

LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY:

 ...  G.A. Cohen, the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford,first came to international prominence with his impressive 1978 book on Marx'shistorical materialism, a volume which gave birth to "analytical Marxism....  Yet, thanks to Marx, and especiallyEngels's infatuation with dialectics - and the intellectual subservience of somany of their followers - Hegel's idea of dialectic remained a vibrant one inEuropean thought for the next century-and-a-half. ...  Marx's Hegelian Hangover: HistoricalExplanation without Dialectics ...  Manyof the contradictions that he saw in Victorian capitalism and that weresubsequently addressed by reformist governments have begun reappearing in newguises, like mutant viruses... . [Marx] wrote riveting passages aboutglobalization, inequality, political corruption, monopolization, technicalprogress, the decline of high culture, and the enervating nature of modernexistence ... . ...  Normative theory,then, is necessary, according to Cohen, to help bring about the"just" state of affairs that the Hegelian hangover in Marx used toguarantee. ... " Cohen, as we have seen, is not so optimistic, but it nowappears that he simply substitutes a different kind of optimism, even lessempirically grounded than Marx's: namely, optimism that socialist advocacy forequality will bring about justice, even in the face of scarcity. ... 

 

TEXT:

 [*1129]

I. Introduction

 

 G.A. Cohen, the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford,first came to international prominence with his impressive 1978 book on Marx'shistorical materialism, n1 avolume which gave birth to "analytical Marxism." n2 AnalyticalMarxists reformulated, criticized, and tried to salvage central features ofMarx's theories of history, ideology, politics, and economics. They did so notonly by bringing a welcome argumentative rigor and clarity to the exposition ofMarx's ideas, but also by purging Marxist thinking of what we may call its"Hegelian hangover," that is, its (sometimes tacit) commitment toHegelian assumptions about matters of both philosophical substance and method.In particular, analytical Marxists "deny that there is  [*1130] anything of value which distinguishes [Marx's] method from that ofmainstream social science." n3 Thus, analytical Marxists repudiate Marx'sunfortunate attachment to the idea of a distinctively dialectical method ofanalysis and explanation, n4 according to which (as Cohen explains it)"every living thing ... develops by unfolding its inner nature in outwardforms and, when it has fully elaborated that nature, it dies, disappears, istransformed into a successor form precisely because it has succeeded inelaborating itself fully." n5 Dialectics, so understood, entailsteleology: A thing's "inner nature" determines its end, i.e., what itcan and will become.

Applied tothe phenomenon of socioeconomic change, dialectics leads to what Cohen aptlycalls Marx's "obstetric conception of political practice." n6According to this view, "The prescribed way forward [i.e., to communism]is dictated by the process of pregnancy itself. The solution [communism] is theconsummation of the full development of the problem [capitalism]." n7Historical development is like a normal pregnancy: The outcome is foreordained- a baby will be born approximately nine months after conception - and all we,as historical actors, can do is facilitate, and perhaps ever-so-slightlyaccelerate, the predetermined conclusion. The "solution" (the baby)is the consummation of the full development of the "problem" (thepregnancy).

As Cohennotes, this "dialectical idea ... of self-destruction throughself-fulfillment" n8 and its cognate doctrine that "politics teasessolutions out of developing problems" n9 are ideas that "few wouldnow regard as consonant with the demands of rigorous science." n10 Ofcourse, that understates the point: A commitment to dialectical methods ofanalysis and explanation looks like nothing more than a priori dogma, not themethodological linchpin of any successful empirical science. Hegel, who died in1831, was himself a dead issue in German philosophy by the 1850s, having beenskewered on the end of Schopenhauer's pen, turned on his head by Feuerbach, anddismissed or ignored by the new breed of German materialists and NeoKantians.n11 Yet,  [*1131]  thanks to Marx, and especially Engels'sinfatuation with dialectics - and the intellectual subservience of so many oftheir followers - Hegel's idea of dialectic remained a vibrant one in Europeanthought for the next century-and-a-half.

Whatremains of Marx without the Hegelian hangover? The perhaps surprising answer isquite a lot, and certainly everything worthwhile! n12 Curiously, G. A. Cohen'simportant book, If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?, obscuresthis point. Cohen infers from the need for Marx to sober up from his Hegelianhangover that Marxists can no longer ignore the questions of normative moraland political philosophy, as Marx himself did: Once the "success of the[revolutionary] cause is [no longer] guaranteed ... Marxists, or what wereMarxists, are increasingly impelled into normative political philosophy."n13

Thus,Cohen's brand of Marxism returns the reader to the familiar academic terrain ofarmchair normative theory a la Rawls and Nozick. Whereas much of Cohen's 1995 collection ofessays n14 took on the libertarian challenge to a Marxish n15 conception ofequality and justice, the current volume attacks the liberal conceptionassociated with Rawls, according to which "distributive justice andinjustice are features of the rules of the public order alone." n16 This raisesthe question, as Cohen has dubbed it, of the "site" of distributivejustice: Do principles of distributive justice govern only "the rules ofthe public order," as Rawls would have it, or must they also govern"personal choice," n17 "the attitudes people sustain toward eachother in the thick of daily life"? n18 In Cohen's rather unMarxian view, "both justrules [for society] and just personal choice within the framework set by justrules are necessary for distributive justice." n19 Cohen's is an argumentfor a variation on the theme "the personal is political," or, moreprecisely, for the Christian version of that theme according to which genuine"equality requires ... a moral revolution, a revolution in the humansoul." n20 Equality, in short, demands not just institutional arrangementsfavoring egalitarian norms, but also an  [*1132] egalitarian "social ethos," n21 which informs the actions ofcitizens in their daily lives, an ethos which takes root in the"soul." Hence, the title of his book: If you're really anegalitarian, then it's not enough to support the redistributive, liberal state- you really ought to be giving away your money too! n22

Roughlyhalf of Cohen's book is devoted to a lucid and provocative exposition andcritique of what he calls "Classical Marxism," its Hegelian hangover,and the obstetric metaphor; the second half is an exercise in normative theory,with Rawls as its target. The latter arguments have, so far, attracted the mostattention, n23 but I will accord the first half of the book somewhat more spacehere. n24 The traditional Marxian attitude towards normative theory - namely,that it is pointless because ineffectual - is one that resonates with a morerecent attack on normative theory familiar to legal scholars from the work ofRichard Posner. n25 Attacking what he calls "academic moralism" n26 -"the kind of moral theorizing nowadays considered rigorous in universitycircles" n27 - Posner claims that such theorizing

 

 

has no prospect of improving humanbehavior. Knowing the moral thing to do furnishes no motive, and creates nomotivation, for doing it; motive and motivation have to come from outsidemorality. n28 Even if this is wrong, the analytical tools employed in academicmoralism - whether moral casuistry, or reasoning from the canonical texts ofmoral philosophy, or careful analysis, or reflective equilibrium, or somecombination of these tools - are too feeble to override either narrowself-interest or [pre-existing] moral intuitions. And  [*1133] academic moralists have neither the rhetorical skills nor the factualknowledge that might enable them to persuade without having good methods ofinquiry and analysis. As a result of its analytical, rhetorical, and factualdeficiencies, academic moralism is helpless when intuitions clash orself-interest opposes, and otiose when they line up. n29

 

 With a slight change in the rhetoric, Marxcould have been the author of this passage. Moreover, Marx and Posner may bemore correct about the efficacy of moral theory than either Cohen or Posner'scritics n30 allow. Or so I shall argue in what follows. Let us begin, however,by considering what remains of Marx's theory of history once we cure Marx ofthe Hegelian hangover.

II. Marx'sHegelian Hangover: Historical Explanation without Dialectics

 

 Iwant to grant Cohen and other analytical Marxists that dialectics, understoodas an a priori constraint on explanation, is unacceptable. I also do not wantto dispute the interpretive point that Marx sometimes took dialectics quiteseriously. The interpretive point is of interest to Marx scholars, to be sure,but not to philosophers, historians, or readers of this journal. The questionthat really matters is ought Marx - or a Marxian - be committed to dialectics?Does his theory of historical change require it? Does his opposition tonormative theory demand it? In all these cases, the answer is "no."

Why doesCohen not attend to these points? The source of the problem is suggested by hisexplanation of the sense in which Marx and Engels take "scientificsocialism" to be "scientific": n31

 

 

 The most obvious and least interesting sense,though not therefore the least important sense, in which it is, in their view,scientific, is that it possesses a  [*1134] scientifically defensible theory of history in general and of capitalismin particular.

 ... .

  But themost interesting claim is about how the movement which possesses the sciencerelates to the social reality which generates the movement and the science .... The movement understands ... how it itself arises ... . It is theconsciousness of social reality, in a political form. ... .Scientific socialismis what it is because of a different self-perception... . It understands itselfas utopian [i.e., non-scientific] socialism could not, as the reflex of thestage of development at which it arises, this now being the stage whencapitalism's contradictions are acute and the proletarian movement is strong.It understands itself as the consciousness of the movement, rather than asinspired by universally valid ideals. It consequently looks for the solution tothe evils of capitalism in the process in which capitalism is transformingitself. n32

 

 Cohen thinks the "most interesting"- but not necessarily, he admits, the most "important" - reason thatMarx takes his theory to be scientific n33 is that it displays a dialecticalself-understanding. "Scientific socialism" understands both (a) thatit itself is historically conditioned (such "understanding" is onlypossible at the point at which "capitalism's contradictions areacute"), and (b) that the "solution" (i.e., communistrevolution) is immanent in the problem (i.e., the developing contradictions ofcapitalism). These are the kinds of claims that Cohen rightly notes are not"consonant with the demands of rigorous science." n34

Yet it is actually what Cohen calls"the least interesting" sense of "scientific socialism"that has any plausible claim to scientific status, namely, that Marx's theoryactually explains and predicts historical and economic developments. Consider:If Marx's theory of historical change both explained historical developmentsand predicted them, then everyone would view it as a scientific theory whetheror not it had the Hegelian features noted above.

Of course,there are no theories of historical change, to date, that successfully explainand predict events with the quantitative precision we associate with theoriesin the natural sciences. This may, in part, be an artifact of the unwarrantedimposition of standards of explanatory and predictive success appropriate tothe study of inanimate matter onto human phenomena. As one philosopher ofscience notes: "Historians lack the physicist's freedom to choosequestions specially susceptible to rigorous answers ... History is committed toasking questions that are salient because of their practical  [*1135] importance, not because of their susceptibility to rigorousanswers." n35 Moreover, assuming we grant, as most philosophers of sciencenow believe, that "explanatory adequacy is essentially pragmatic andfield-specific" n36 - what counts as a good explanation depends on our interestsand may vary with domain (a good explanation in history might not be so good inbiochemistry) - then we can recognize, as most historians do, that there arebetter and worse historical explanations, even if none meets the standards ofquantitative precision we associate with physics or chemistry.

Once wegrant the latter, however, then it is surely obvious that Marxian historicalexplanations have been and continue to be among the best and most plausible inthe field. The enormous and impressive historical literature employing aMarxian framework would have established this, one should think, beyond doubt.n37 But professional history aside, it is surely striking that even thecapitalist media have taken note of the power of Marx's predictions. So, forexample, that quintessentially "bourgeois liberal" newspaper, The NewYork Times, noted:

 

Karl Marx may have been right after all.

 

As readers revisit "The CommunistManifesto" on its 150th anniversary, those on the left and the right havebeen struck by the eerie way in which its 1848 description of capitalismresembles the restless, anxious and competitive world of today's globaleconomy. Economists and political scientists note how the manifesto, written byMarx and Friedrich Engels, recognized the unstoppable wealth-creating power ofcapitalism, predicted it would conquer the world, and warned that thisinevitable globalization of national economies and cultures would have divisiveand painful consequences. n38

 

 The Times is joined by the economics writerfor The New Yorker:

 

Marx was a student of capitalism, andthat is how he should be judged. Many of the contradictions that he saw inVictorian capitalism and that were subsequently addressed by reformistgovernments have begun reappearing in new guises, like mutant viruses... .[Marx] wrote riveting passages about  [*1136] globalization, inequality, political corruption, monopolization,technical progress, the decline of high culture, and the enervating nature ofmodern existence ... .

 ... .

  His basic insight ... was reintroduced inrecent times by James Carville: "It's the economy, stupid." Marx'sown term for this theory was "the materialist conception of history,"and it is now so widely accepted that analysts of all political views use it, likeCarville, without any attribution. When conservatives argue that the welfarestate is doomed because it stifles private enterprise, or that the Soviet Unioncollapsed because it couldn't match the efficiency of Western capitalism, theyare adopting Marx's argument that economics is the driving force in humandevelopment. Indeed, as Sir John Hicks, a Nobel Prize-winning Britisheconomist, noted in 1969, when it comes to theories of history Karl Marx stillhas the field pretty much to himself. n39

 

 Tobe sure, it is all a bit more complicated than that, but the accuracy of Marx'squalitative predictions is still striking: Capitalism continues to conquer theglobe; its effect is the gradual erasure of cultural and regional identities;n40 growing economic inequality is the norm in the advanced capitalistsocieties; n41  [*1137]  where capitalism triumphs, market normsgradually dominate all spheres of life, public and private; class positioncontinues to be the defining determinant of political outlook; n42 the dominantclass dominates the political process, which, in turn, does its bidding; n43and so on. Marx and Engels write, for example: n44

 The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upperhand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It haspitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his"natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus betweenman and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment."n45 ... . It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place ofthe numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single,unconscionable freedom - Free Trade. n46

 

 
 [*1138]

 

 ... . It has converted the physician, thelawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers.n47

  ... . The need for a constantly expandingmarket for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of theglobe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexionseverywhere. n48

  ... .

  The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement ofall instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication,draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap pricesof its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down allChinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatredof foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, toadopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what itcalls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. Inone word, it creates a world after its own image.

 The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing awaywith the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and ofproperty. It has agglomerated population, centralised means of production, andhas concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this waspolitical centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, withseparate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, became lumpedtogether into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one nationalclass-interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff. n49

 

 Does anyone doubt that these remarks writtenmore than 150 years ago describe, even more accurately, our world and its owndevelopmental tendencies today?

Why mightCohen have ignored these explanatory and predictive virtues of Marx's accountof capitalism? The answer must surely have something to do with the verydistinctive interpretation of Marx's theory of history Cohen offered in hisfamous 1978 book, n50 according to which Marx presented a functionalist theoryof history, the one most clearly articulated in the 1859 preface to AContribution to the Critique of Political Economy. n51 As Cohen notes in thebook under review, "the obstetric metaphor is deeply impressed  [*1139] on" this preface. n52 Thus, the functionalist theory of history andthe Hegelian hangover go hand-in-hand on Cohen's rendering.

Accordingto Cohen's interpretation, Marx offers functionalist explanations of historicalchange. In functional explanations, "the character of what is explained isdetermined by its effect on what explains it." n53 Functional explanationsare most familiar from evolutionary biology. We might explain the innatesucking reflex in (most) infants, for example, by reference to its fulfilling thefunction of helping newborns get the nutrition they need to survive. So, too,Cohen's Marx explains the ideological "superstructure" of a society(roughly, the dominant moral and political ideas of a particular epoch) interms of its fulfilling the function of stabilizing the "relations ofproduction" (roughly, the existing set of property rights), and heexplains the "relations of production" in terms of their fulfillingthe function of promoting the maximal growth of the "forces ofproduction" (roughly, "technology, science, and human skills"n54). As Elster, interpreting Cohen (interpreting Marx), usefully puts it:"Politics and ideas are explained by the fact that they stabilize propertyrights; and property rights are explained by the fact that they give an impetusto technical change." n55

Historicaltransformations, on this account, occur when the relations of production failto fulfill their function, i.e., fail to promote the maximal development of theforces of production. (So, e.g., a Marxist functionalist would say that theSoviet Union collapsed because the relations of production - state ownership ofthe major forces of production conjoined with bureaucratic central planning -fettered, rather than enhanced, the use of the productive forces.) On thisstory, a tendency towards growth in productive power is simply taken as a brutefact of history. n56

Thedifficulty is that the 1859 preface, on which the functionalist interpretationis largely based, is highly atypical, and, in particular, it bears norelationship to Marx's own practice of historical explanation in such works asThe Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte n57 from 1852 - the latter of whichis also far more typical of what Marxian historians do as well. Here it isclass struggle - and the way in which actions, policies, and ideologies reflectthe economic interests of particular classes - that figures centrally inhistorical explanation. "History ... is the history of classstruggles," Marx says famously in The Communist Manifesto. n58 And that isa far more suggestive
 [*1140] slogan for historical explanation than "history is the history ofthe growth of productive power." n59 As Jon Elster notes in criticizingCohen, the difficulty with the functionalist interpretation of Marx's theory ofhistory is that one needs "an account of how the less than optimalcharacter of the existing relations of production motivates individual men tocollective action for the purpose of ushering in a new set of relations."n60 In other words, why wouldthe possibility of developing the productive forces give anyone a reason foracting?

Classstruggle supplies the answer, as Cohen himself recognized long ago. He notes:

Classes are permanently poised againstone another, and that class tends to prevail whose rule would best meet thedemands of production. But how does the fact that production would prosperunder a certain class ensure its dominion? Part of the answer is that there isa general stake in stable and thriving production, so that the class bestplaced to deliver it attracts allies for other strata in society. Prospectiveruling classes are often able to raise support among the classes subjected tothe ruling class they would displace. Contrariwise, classes unsuited to thetask of governing society tend to lack the confidence political hegemonyrequires, and if they do seize power, they tend not to hold it for long. n61

 Put more colloquially: If the nascentbourgeoisie can out-produce the complacent feudal lords, it should hardly besurprising that (a) they try to, and (b) they displace, in the end, theunproductive feudal lords. n62

But Cohenmaintains that growth of productive forces is still the fundamental explanatoryforce in Marx's theory. He says, "It is true that for Marx the immediateexplanation of major social transformations is often found  [*1141] in the battle between classes. But that is not the fundamentalexplanation of social change." n63 For the fundamental explanation, weneed to answer the question: "Why does the successful class succeed? Marxfinds the answer in the character of the productive forces." n64 This onlyshows, however, that growth of productive power is the fundamental notion inMarx's theory of history on the assumption that functional explanation is thefundamental form of explanation in his theory. But it can not be - and this isthe central difficulty in Cohen's approach - for functional explanations cannot be fundamental. In the case of Marx's theory, it is precisely the notion ofclass struggle that provides the causal mechanism that renders functionalexplanations intelligible in the first place! Let me explain.

Allfunctional explanations, it turns out, have the suspicious feature that theexplanandum (the thing to be explained) is temporally prior to the explanans(that which does the explaining). The sucking reflex (the explanandum) isclearly prior to the fact of survival (the explanans). But how can anythingexplain the existence and character of something that comes before it? Genuineexplanations involve the temporal priority of explanans over explanandum: youexplain the occurrence of X by something that came before X in time, not afterit! So if functional explanations are genuine, they must satisfy this temporaldemand. How can they do so?

Theanswer, in a nutshell, is that functional explanations, if they are realexplanations, have to be reducible to or shorthands for ordinary causalexplanations (X was caused by Y, and Y preceded X in time). n65 When we say thesucking reflex in infants is explained by the contribution it makes to thesurvival of newborns, what we really mean is that the reason the sucking reflexcame to predominate in the population of infants is that, in the past, thoseinfants with the genetic predisposition for the sucking reflex n66 survived andwent on to reproduce at much higher rates than those lacking that geneticpredisposition. So a genetic predisposition towards sucking causes survival,which over time and populations, causes most infants to end up having that geneticpredisposition.

Classstruggle must play the same role with respect to Cohen's functionalist versionof historical materialism: The reason relations of production favorable to themaximal development of the forces of production come into being is becauseclasses that can effectively exploit the forces of production try to bring suchrelations about. Here is how Peter Railton put the point many years ago:[*1142]  

Historically man has enlarged what are ineffect his natural ("material") possibilities through the developmentof new productive forces, and, with this, new ranges of adaptations or socialforms ... became possible. When the terms of competition thus shift,individuals or groups who happen to be so situated or so to act as to take differentialadvantage of these changes in adaptive possibilities will acquire increasedresources, power, and so on. The result may be the emergence into prominence ofnew groups at the expense of those groups who previously commanded resources,power, and so on. If the terms of competition shift markedly, and if new groupsemerge who take advantage of these changes, the resulting conflict may lead toan overthrow of existing social relations... . Marx analyzes such intergroupcompetition as class struggle, since the groupings that emerge in suchconflicts are, he believes, determined by the relation of individuals to theproductive forces... .

 

 

 

 Asin the biological case, one can give a "fitness"-invoking [orfunctionalist] gloss on this process: a dominant class that cannot achieveefficient exploitation of the possibilities inherent in the existing state ofproductive forces will tend to be replaced by a class that can, and, in theprocess, social relations as a whole will be reshaped to reflect the mode ofexistence of this more efficient class. n67

 

 Sofunctionalist explanations are simply a gloss on ordinary causal explanationsin terms of class struggle. And class struggle provides a fruitful explanatoryrubric through which to view a wide range of historical events, from slavery tourban history. n68 And none of this requires an a priori commitment to eitherdialectics or teleology. That is all to the good, since, as Joshua Cohenobserved two decades ago, "there are no system-transcendent tendencies ofproductive development" throughout history; n69 there are numerousinstances of productive regression and stagnation that simply do not fit thefunctionalist version of historical materialism promulgated by G. A. Cohen. n70Any viable Marxian approach to history must "reject[] the attempt torestate scientifically a teleological image of history as driven by a tendencyto material progress." n71

III.Normative Theory and the Demands of Equality

 

 G.A. Cohen notes, correctly, that, "Classical Marxism distinguished itselffrom what it condemned as the socialism of dreams by declaring a commitment tohard-headed historical and economic analysis: It was proud of what itconsidered to be the stoutly factual character of its central claims." n72Classical  [*1143]  Marxism - including, clearly, Marx himself -had, in other words, a scientistic self-conception. The goal of theorizing isnot to justify communism as morally desirable or just, but rather to constructan adequate descriptive and explanatory account of socio-economic change thatwill have practical payoffs in political organizing and revolutionary activity.On the Marxian view, what people need is not a theory of justice, or a theoryof the good and the right, but rather the intellectual tools to understand - torender visible - the networks of socioeconomic causation that circumscribetheir lives - how dominant classes try to remain dominant by construing theirrule as legitimate and in the general interest; how dominance is defined byeconomic power, and so on. As Cohen observes:

Values of equality, community, and humanself-realization were undoubtedly integral to the Marxist belief structure... .

  Yet Marxists were not preoccupied with, andtherefore never examined, principles of equality, or indeed any other values orprinciples. Instead, they devoted their intellectual energy to the hard factualcarapace surrounding their values, to bold explanatory theses about history ingeneral and capitalism in particular ... . n73

  Cohen thinks that Marxism has now "lostmuch or most of its carapace, its hard shell of supposed fact," and soconcludes that, "to the extent that Marxism is still alive ... it presentsitself as a set of values and a set of designs for realizing thosevalues." n74

We have,to be sure, agreed with Cohen and other analytical Marxists that  [*1144] there is no factual component to the Hegelian hangover - the a prioricommitment to dialectics and teleology - but that concession still ignores theextent to which Marxian explanations of historical change and predictions aboutthe tendencies of capitalism may be vindicated a posteriori. n75 Of course,Cohen's real argument for the move from the scientistic self-understanding ofMarxist theorizing to a normative version of Marxist theory depends, he thinks,on the failure of the Hegelian hangover component of Marx's view. He writes:

Capitalism does not produce its owngravediggers. The old (partly real, partly imagined) agency of socialisttransformation is gone, and there is not, and never will be, another one likeit. Socialists have to settle for a less dramatic scenario, and they mustengage in more moral advocacy than used to be fashionable. n76

  The claim that "capitalism does notproduce its own gravediggers" is, to be sure, not an a priori truth; thequestion is what the a posteriori evidence is for rejecting it. That capitalismis flourishing is hardly evidence, unless one believes that history is over. Cohen,alas, has a somewhat unfortunate tendency to assume precisely this, withoutever explaining why. So, for example, in the quote above he declares that there"never will be ... another" revolutionary agent like the proletariatof Classical Marxism. But how does he know? And in explaining why"classical Marxists believed that material equality ... was ...historically inevitable," n77 he says, correctly that,

Two supposedly irrepressible historicaltrends, working together, guaranteed the future material equality. One was therise of an organized working class, whose social emplacement, at the short endof inequality, directed it in favor of equality. The workers' movement wouldgrow in numbers and in strength, until it had the power to abolish the unequalsociety which had nurtured its growth. And the other trend helping to ensure aneventual equality was the development of the productive forces, the continualincrease in the human power to transform nature for human benefit. That growthwould issue in a material abundance so great that anything anyone needed for arichly fulfilling life could be taken from the common store at no cost toanyone. n78

 Yet Cohen, writing once again as thoughhistory were over, concludes: "History has shredded each of the predictionsthat I have just sketched." n79 We will turn, in a moment, to thesurprisingly non-existent empirical basis for these claims. But let uscertainly grant Cohen this: Marx was spectacularly wrong about questions oftiming. He thought, like many a giddy optimist of the nineteenth-century, thatthe period of limitless abundance was almost at hand, and thus the end ofcapitalism near. No doubt his Eurocentric focus encouraged this way ofthinking, since the industrial and technological progress  [*1145] there was striking. But, as we discussed in the prior section, thequalitative predictions in Marx about the tendencies of capitalism have provento be highly accurate in the 150 years since, except with respect to the issueof timing.

Why doesCohen think history has "shredded" the Marxian predictions notedabove? He observes, correctly, that the proletariat did not become the"immense majority," n80 and that, increasingly, the immiserated ofthe world are not producers like the classic working class; they are justmiserable. n81 But Cohen thinks that a group, to be an effective agent ofrevolution, has to have the four features that the classic nineteenth-centuryproletariat were supposed to have: They were the majority; they produced thewealth of society; they were exploited by the capitalist class; and they wereneedy. n82 It is true, as Cohen notes, that the second and third features madethe cause of the proletariat particularly appealing: They produced society'swealth, yet it was taken from them. But what he never explains is why it wouldnot suffice for revolution if the majority of humanity was needy in conjunctionwith there being enough productive power to meet their needs? Indeed, the wholediscussion proceeds, somewhat oddly, without citation of any empirical evidenceone way or the other!

Now it istrue that my reformulation of the conditions for revolutionary change requiresthat Marx's abundance prediction be made good as well. And Cohen disputes thisprediction also - though, once again, without citing empirical support. He says"our environment is already severely degraded" such that "ifthere is a way out of the crisis, then it must include much less aggregatematerial consumption than what now prevails," meaning "unwantedchanges of lifestyle" for those in the affluent West. n83 Thus, heconcludes:

It is certain that we can not achieveWestern-style goods and services for humanity as a whole, nor even sustain themfor as large a minority as has enjoyed them, by drawing on the fuels and materialsthat we have hitherto used to provide them.

  We can no longer sustain Marx's extravagant,pre-Green, materialist optimism. At least for the foreseeable future, we haveto abandon the vision of abundance. n84

  What is utterly bizarre here is that theseempirical propositions are affirmed without support, and apparently inindifference to, or ignorance of, the empirical literature that disputes them.n85 Cohen would, apparently, have  [*1146] Marxists abandon the empirical claims of the theory without any actualempirical evidence to the contrary!

This partof Cohen's book, then, is a somewhat disappointing exercise in armchairpolitical economy. There still remains, however, the question why he thinksMarxists should turn to normative theory. Cohen says, recall, that since"capitalism does not produce its own gravedigger" - i.e., itsdownfall is not inevitable - "Socialists ... must engage in more moraladvocacy than used to be fashionable." n86 He makes the same basic pointseveral times:

The disintegration of the characteristics[possessed by the classic proletariat] produces an intellectual need tophilosophize, which is related to a political need to be clear as never beforeabout values and principles, for the sake of socialist advocacy. n87

 Thedisintegration of the proletariat induces persons of Marxist formation to turnto normative political philosophy, and ... the loss of confidence in a futureunlimited abundance reinforces their tendency to take that turn. n88

  Thus, the turn to normative theory isjustified primarily on the grounds that, in the absence of a teleological viewof history, there is no reason to think that the "just" state ofaffairs is inevitable. Normative theory, then, is necessary, according toCohen, to help bring about the "just" state of affairs that theHegelian hangover in Marx used to guarantee.

Inpitching the case for normative theory this way - i.e., in terms of itsnecessity for bringing about certain consequences (namely, the achievement ofjustice) - Cohen is accepting the fundamentally pragmatic premise of Marx'swhole approach to philosophy. The clearest statement of this pragmatic premisecomes in Marx's Second Thesis on Feuerbach: "The dispute over the reality ornon-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholasticquestion." n89 In otherwords, philosophical questions - e.g., about whether or not thought correspondsto reality, or whether capitalism is just - are to be dismissed as "purelyscholastic" unless they make a difference in practice, that is, unlessthey have some impact on what we do and how we live. This is a particularlysevere form of pragmatism, but it is plainly central to Marx's view ofphilosophy.


 [*1147] Now, as Cohen notes, Marx believed that, "Devoting energy to thequestion, "What is the right way to distribute?' is futile with respect tothe present ... ." n90 - that is, it is a purely "scholastic"question in the sense just noted. But Cohen retorts: "We can no longerbelieve the factual premises of those conclusions about the practical(ir)relevance of the study of norms." n91 The locution here is striking:"We can no longer believe" that the study of norms is practicallyirrelevant. But why can't we? Cohen never says. One suspects that this is morethe expression of a pious hope than of the discovery of contrary evidence. AsCohen observes about Marx, no doubt correctly: "It was because he was souncompromisingly pessimistic about the social consequences of anything lessthan limitless abundance that Marx needed to be so optimistic about thepossibility of that abundance." n92 Cohen, as we have seen, is not sooptimistic, but it now appears that he simply substitutes a different kind ofoptimism, even less empirically grounded than Marx's: namely, optimism thatsocialist advocacy for equality will bring about justice, even in the face ofscarcity. But why anyone else should believe this is, alas, never explained.

Indeed,one might worry that Cohen's own elegant exercise in normative theory iscounter-evidence to his own optimism. For Cohen's book has attracted mostattention, as noted, for its argument that a genuine commitment to equality andjustice requires changes in individual behavior. He rejects the Rawlsian ideathat principles of justice apply only to "the basic structure" ofsociety; instead, he argues,

Justice cannot be a matter only of thestate-legislated structure in which people act but is also a matter of the actsthey choose within that structure, the personal choices of their daily lives. Ihave come to think, in the words of a recently familiar slogan, that thepersonal is political. n93

  This means, in particular, that"principles of distributive justice ... apply, wherever else they do, to people'slegally unconstrained choices." n94

The cruxof Cohen's argument against Rawls begins by noting that, according to Rawls's"difference principle," "inequalities are just if and only ifthey are necessary to make the worst off people in society better off than theyotherwise would be." n95 But this application of the difference principletakes for granted that some people - those who can command more income fortheir work - are "acquisitive maximizers in daily life," n96 i.e.,they want to get as much as possible for themselves, and thus the differenceprinciple is necessary  [*1148]  to insure that some "of the extra whichthey will then produce can be recruited on behalf of the worst off." n97But such a society is not a just one. As Thomas Nagel usefully summarizes theargument:

[A] society in which it is impossible tooptimize the condition of the poor without permitting large inequalities is nota just society. It is unjust, because what makes these inequalities"necessary" is the distinctly non-egalitarian motivation of theindividuals whose pursuit of personal gain drives the economy. n98

  There is no principled justification, Cohenargues, for exempting personal motivation and choice from the demands ofprinciples of justice, as the Rawlsian slogan - "The principles of justicegovern only the basic structure of a just society" n99 - would suggest. Hewrites:

Why should we care so disproportionatelyabout the coercive basic structure [of society], when the major reason forcaring about it, its impact on people's lives, is also a reason for caringabout informal structure and patterns of personal choice? To the extent that wecare about coercive structure because it is fateful with regard to [thedistribution of] benefits and burdens, we must care equally about the [informalsocial] ethic that sustains gender inequality, and inegalitarian incentives.n100

  If one is concerned with "distributivejustice" - "by which I uneccentrically mean justice (and its lack) inthe distribution of benefits and burdens to individuals" n101 - then itseems arbitrary to think the moral demands of justice apply only to the"basic structure" of society, rather than to all those other forces -noncoercive conventions, social ethos, and personal choices - that are equallycapable of affecting the distribution of benefits and burdens.

Cohenfocuses, in particular, on the personal choice of rich egalitarians not to giveaway their money. As Cohen notes, "Most people find the posture of richfolk who profess a belief in equality peculiar," n102 and he does notexempt himself from the charge: "I am, like most professors, much richerthan the average person in my society, even though, for various reasons thatneed not be laid out here, I am quite poor, as professors go." n103 TheMarxist in the grips of the Hegelian hangover could, of course, say, as a DavidLodge character does (whom Cohen quotes): ""By renouncing our ownlittle bit of privilege ... we should not accelerate by one minute theconsummation of that [historical] process, which has its own inexorable rhythmand momentum, and is
 [*1149] determined by the pressure of mass movements, not by the puny actions ofindividuals.'" n104 But Cohen has already argued against such historicalcomplacency. Thus, Cohen carefully reviews a variety of other arguments therich egalitarian might give, and finds most of them wanting. n105 So, forexample, Cohen says to the rich egalitarian,If you hate inequality because youthink it is unjust, how can you qualmlessly accept and retain money yourretention of which embodies injustice - money which you could give to others,or donate to an egalitarian cause, and thereby diminish, or hope to diminish,the amount of injustice that prevails, by benefiting sufferers of thatinjustice? n106

  So, too, Cohen responds to the claim that theindividual charity of a rich egalitarian is a mere "drop in theocean" by observing that, "getting twenty people out of dire straitsis a negligible effect in the ... numerical sense, when five million are insuch straits, but it is not plausible to say that it is negligible in the senseof unimportant, especially for someone whose egalitarianism focuses on howbadly off the badly off are." n107

Interestingly,Cohen allows that those who do not think inequality is "unjust" n108- namely, utilitarians - are invulnerable to many of these arguments. For theutilitarian, it is not equality, but human well-being, that is morallyfundamental. n109 And utilitarians customarily distinguish between "whatstates of affairs ... are good and what obligations [an individual] has topromote those states of affairs." n110 It might be good if most peoplewere better off, but, from a utilitarian standpoint, it hardly follows that Ihave to give money away, absent some reason for thinking it would produce the desiredstate of affairs - which, in the absence of compulsory collective action, itwould not. [*1150]  Cohen also allowsthat a rich egalitarian might have one good argument for remaining wealthy; hecalls it the "relative-disadvantage" argument:

Rich egalitarian people might be willingto give generously only if similarly situated people would in general be readyto do the same. But, as they well know, those others are not similarlydisposed. And because others will not give, giving severely prejudices theirself-interest and, more poignantly, the interest of members of their families.If Johnny's dad buys him a new bicycle, how can Molly's dad explain why hedoesn't buy one for Molly?

  ... To expect a given rich person to be withina minority that give is to demand that he incur particular sorts of sacrificethat poor people need not face, such as ... the sacrifice ... of deliberatelydenying one's child what one has the power to give her and what comparablyplaced parents give theirs. Accordingly, a person can, in full consistency,think it desirable for tax policy and/or a general ethos to favor the badlyoff, yet resist furthering their cause by extravagant personal initiative in anunequal society that lacks that policy or ethos. n111

  But this argument only works if the"metric of equality" is "welfarist" - i.e., based on thewelfare or well-being of each individual - since only the welfarist can"take seriously the predicament of people whose tastes are expensive,"n112 as the tastes of our rich egalitarian and his offspring would be. Otheregalitarians have no reason to take the special burdens of soon-to-be-formerrich kids as constituting a moral argument against disposing of one's wealth.

Let ussuppose, then, that Cohen is right that true egalitarians would give away theirmoney - does he really think any will? Here the review by Thomas Nagel -distinguished political philosopher, non-utilitarian and highly remuneratedprofessor of law and philosophy at NYU - is telling. Nagel writes:

I have to admit that, although I am anadherent of the liberal conception of [justice and equality], I don't have ananswer to Cohen's charge of moral incoherence. It is hard to render consistentthe exemption of private choice from the motives that support redistributivepublic policies. I could sign a standing banker's order giving away everythingI earn above the national average, for example, and it wouldn't kill me. Icould even try to increase my income at the same time, knowing the excess wouldgo to people who needed it more than I did. I'm not about to do anything of thekind, but the equality-friendly justifications I can think of for not doing soall strike me as rationalizations. n113

  Here we have a rather striking confirmation ofPosner's point about the causal inertness of moral argumentation. Nagel is asophisticated liberal philosopher; he understands and appreciates the force ofCohen's arguments and has no response to them; and yet he admits it will haveno effect whatsoever on his  [*1151]  behavior. Isn't this rather dramatic evidencein favor of Posnerian - and Marxian - skepticism about normative theory? Ifhigh quality moral philosophy does not change the behavior of high quality moralphilosophers, why think it is going to affect anyone else? There is, of course,no reason to think anything of the sort.

IV.Conclusion: What Is To Be Done?

  Normative theory changes nothing. n114 This isa "terrible truth," as Nietzsche would say, but a truth nonetheless.Normative theory may, to be sure, get people tenure, increase their incomes,and make them celebrities within academe. It may provide the satisfactionsattendant upon deeper understanding of some aspect of human life. It mayoccasionally change a philosopher's view about some normative question too. Butas Thomas Nagel wrote many years ago, in a passage that anticipates Posner'smore recent polemics:

 

 

Moral judgment and moral theory certainlyapply to public questions, but they are notably ineffective. When powerfulinterests are involved it is very difficult to change anything by arguments,however cogent, with appeal to decency, humanity, compassion or, fairness. n115

  One posture in response to this problem issimply to declare, as Nagel does, that the value of moral theory "cannotbe measured by its practical effects." n116 But that response isunavailable to G. A. Cohen, since he has joined Marx in embracing the"practical effects" test as the relevant measure of value in matterstheoretical. n117 And once we take that as the measure of theoretical value,then the turn to normative theory that Cohen recommends for Marxists has noreal justification. Marxists, like Posnerians, think that what we really needis an empirical understanding of how the world works, not ineffectualexhortation by academic philosophers to do the morally right thing. Marxistsand Posnerians differ, to be sure, over how the world really works. But thatquestion is, to quote Cohen, "where the action is," or at least oughtto be.

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FOOTNOTES:

n1. G. A.Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory Of History: A Defence (1978).

n2. Otherleading figures in "analytical Marxism" include Jon Elster (ColumbiaUniversity), John Roemer (Yale University), and Allen Wood (StanfordUniversity). See, e.g., Analytical Marxism (John Roemer ed., 1986). Apenetrating critique of Elster's brand of analytical Marxism is Robert PaulWolff, Methodological Individualism and Marx: Some Remarks on Jon Elster, GameTheory, and Other Things, 20 Canadian J. Phil. 469 (1990).

n3. AlexCallinicos, Introduction to Marxist Theory 14 (Alex Callinicos ed., 1989).

n4. AsAllen Wood puts it: "Dialectic is best viewed as a general conception ofthe sort of intelligible structure the world has to offer, and consequently aprogram for the sort of theoretical structure [i.e., explanation] which wouldbest capture it." Allen W. Wood, Karl Marx 190 (1981).

n5. P. 46.

n6. P. 43.

n7. P. 54.

n8. P. 46.

n9. P. 64.

n10. P.64.

n11. Hewas resurrected as an important figure in the Marxian tradition by GeorgLukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Rodney Livingstone trans., MerlinPress 1968) (1923), a book which, via Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge andPolitics (1975), had a significant, and not salutary, impact on Critical LegalStudies. For a discussion, see Brian Leiter, Is There an "American"Jurisprudence?, 17 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 367, 383-84 (1997). On therelationship of CLS to Marxism, see especially Stefan Sciaraffa, Critical LegalStudies: A Marxist Rejoinder, 5 Legal Theory 201 (1999).

n12. Muchof Marxian economics is now defunct, but for reasons that are largelyindependent of the bad influence of the Hegelian hangover. For representativedoubts about the economics, see Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx 60-78(1986).

n13. P.109. Why the success is no longer "guaranteed" is complicated, andwill be explored in more detail in Part II.

n14. G. A.Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (1995).

n15. Iwill use "Marxish" to modify concepts that have no clear pedigree inMarx's writings, but which, arguably, bear some relationship to concerns Marxactually held.

 

n16. P. 4.

n17. P. 6.

n18. P. 3.

n19. P. 3.

n20. P. 2.

n21. P. 3.

n22.Cohen's actual conclusion is less definite than this, as we will see. In fact,Cohen thinks there may be some unanswered arguments in favor of egalitariansremaining rich! See P. 179.

n23. Seeespecially the following discussions of earlier, published versions of thearguments incorporated into the book under review: David Estlund, Liberalism,Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen's Critique of Rawls, 6 J. Pol. Phil. 99(1998); Liam B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 Phil. &Pub. Aff. 251 (1998); Thomas W. Pogge, On the Site of Distributive Justice:Reflections on Cohen and Murphy, 29 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 137 (2000); AndrewWiliams, Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity, 27 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 225(1998). For a similar focus in reviewing the book, see Thomas Nagel, GettingPersonal: Why Don't Egalitarians Give Away Their Own Money?, Times LiterarySupplement, June 23, 2000, at 5.

n24. Manyof the prominent reviews to date have been by political philosophers whoapparently know little about Marx and thus cannot evaluate Cohen's claims.Nagel, supra note 23, is a good example.

n25.Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (1999).

n26. Id.at 5.

n27. Id.

n28.Although Posner does not discuss the issue, he is, in fact, taking a positionon a controversial thesis in moral theory, namely externalism, which deniesthat there is any intrinsic connection between knowledge of the moral rightnessof an action and an agent's motivation to perform it. Kantians deny externalism,while Humeans affirm it. I am inclined to think that the Humeans (and, afortiori, Posner) are rather clearly right (certainly empirically, but alsoconceptually), but such an affirmation will merely strike Kantians as dogmatic.

n29.Posner, supra note 25, at 7. Posner is aware that professional moralphilosophers frequently claim influence for academic moral theory, but, as henotes, no empirical evidence is ever adduced on behalf of these sanctimoniousplatitudes. See id. at 25 & n.27 (discussing such claims by the moralphilosophers Samuel Scheffler and J.B. Schneewind).

n30. See,e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1718 (1998);Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1776 (1998).While Dworkin is right about Posner's misuse of Darwin, he takes advantage ofPosner's rhetorical looseness when he objects, "no doubt many people arenever moved by the logic of a moral argument, even once in their lives, but itis absurd to suppose that no one ever is." Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy& Monica Lewinsky, 47 N.Y. Rev. Books, Mar. 9, 2000, at 48, 51. Butnothing, ultimately, in Posner's view, or that of Marx, requires maintainingthat philosophical arguments have never influenced anyone; the claim at stake,as we shall see, is whether moral arguments bring about social and economicchanges. Indeed, it seems bizarre for Dworkin to lambaste Posner for his"a priori psychological dogma," id., regarding the influence of moralphilosophy, given that Posner's claim, like Marx's, is a posteriori. Where, onewonders, is the evidence for the great influence of the arguments of moralphilosophers?

n31. P.53.

n32. P.53-54.

n33. Mostof the textual support actually cited comes from Engels, not Marx. But that isa philological debate I do not want to enter here.

n34. P.64.

 

n35.Richard W. Miller, Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation and Reality inthe Natural and Social Sciences 134 (1987).

n36. Id.at 95.

n37. See,e.g., Michael A. Bernstein, The Great Depression: Delayed Recovery and EconomicChange in America, 1929-1939 (1987); Elizabeth Blackmar, Manhattan for Rent,1785-1850 (1989); Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change,Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653 (1993); Edward G.Burrows & Mike Wallace, Gotham: A History of New York City to 1898 (1999);David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823(1975); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877(1988); E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (1962); E. J.Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (1975); E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age ofEmpire, 1875-1914 (1987); E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of theWorld, 1914-1991 (1994).

n38. PaulLewis, Marx's Stock Resurges on a 150-Year Tip, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1998, atB9.

n39. JohnCassidy, The Return of Karl Marx, New Yorker, Oct. 20, 1997, at 249, 250.

n40. See,e.g., Bill Keller, Of Famous Arches, Beeg Meks and Rubles, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,1990, at A1 (commenting on the first McDonald's to open in Moscow, "acompany executive ... summing up the company's cultural conquest" said,""We're going to McDonaldize them.'"); Amy Wu, For the Young, HongKong is the Home of Opportunity, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1997, at C12 ("Tous, as long as the paychecks go up and we are satisfied with our lives, thenwhatever flag we are under [British or Chinese] doesn't seem to matter.").

n41. SeeKeith Bradsher, Rich Control More of U.S. Wealth, Study Says, as Debts Grow forPoor, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1996, at A31; Barbara Crossette, Kofi Annan'sAstonishing Facts!, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1998, at D16 ("The world's 225richest individuals, of whom 60 are Americans with total assets of $ 311 billion,have a combined wealth of over $ 1 trillion - equal to the annual income of thepoorest 47 percent of the entire world's population."); Helen Epstein,Time of Indifference, N.Y. Rev. Books, Apr. 12, 2001, at 33, 35 ("Todayper capita income in many developing countries is lower than it was fifteenyears ago, and average living standards in most of them have declined since themid-1980s. Health status is declining along with incomes."); AndrewHacker, The Rich: Who They Are, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1995, 6 (Magazine), at 70;Paul Lewis, Road to Capitalism Taking Toll on Men in the Former Soviet Bloc,N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1999, at A3 (stating that U.N. report notes that "thetransition to a market economy has thus been accompanied by a demographic collapseand a rise in self-destructive behavior, especially among men"); SylviaNasar, Fed Gives New Evidence of 80's Gains by Richest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21,1992, at A1; Elizabeth Olson, Free Markets Leave Women Worse off, Unicef Says,N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1999, at A9; Study Finds Poverty Deepening in FormerCommunist Countries, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 2000, at A3 ("The report ...found that poverty in the region [Eastern Europe] had increased more thantenfold over the decade since the fall of Communism because of reduced spendingon health, education and other social programs."); Michael M. Weinstein,America's Rags-to-Riches Myth, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2000, at A28. See generallyEdward N. Wolff, Top Heavy: The Increasing Inequality of Wealth in America and WhatCan Be Done About It (1996).

n42. See,e.g., Eric Mann, "Foreign Aid" for Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, May 1,1993 at A23 ("Elect a black mayor. In 1973, a multiracial movement electedTom Bradley, a moderate who promised jobs and justice. The Bradley legacy hasbeen a revitalized downtown business district, the transformation of themayor's office into an adjunct to the Chamber of Commerce and the polarizationof wealth and poverty. At every major juncture, the Bradley administrationsided with privilege and against the poor."); Katha Pollitt, Subject toDebate: Most Women in Congress Support Harsh Welfare Reform, The Nation, Dec.4, 1995, at 697 ("The truth is, except on a few high-profile issues -abortion rights, sexual harassment, violence against women - electoral feminismis a pretty pallid affair: a little more money for breast cancer research here,a boost for women business owners there. The main job of the women is the sameas that of the men: playing toward the center, amassing campaign funds, keepingbusiness and big donors happy, and currying favor with the leadership in hopesof receiving plums.").

n43. SeeAn "American Ruling Class"?, Wash. Spectator, Apr. 1, 1993, at 1("For all the talk of "change,' this [Presidential] cabinet isdecidedly establishmentarian. Ten of the 14 cabinet members are lawyers, asmany as ten are millionaires and several are implicated in the savings and loanand corporate takeover scandals of the Reagan-Bush era."); Dan Hamburg,Inside the Money Chase, The Nation, May 5, 1997, at 23, 25 (The formercongressman noting that "the real government of our country is economic,dominated by large corporations that charter the state to do theirbidding"); Bob Herbert, The Donor Class, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1998, at 15("I doubt that many people are aware of just how elite and homogenous thedonor class [to political campaigns] is. It's a tiny group - just one-quarterof 1 percent of the population - and it is not representative of the rest ofthe nation. But its money buys plenty of access."); Nicholas Lemann, TheNew American Consensus: Government of, by and for the Comfortable, N.Y. Times,Nov. 1, 1998, 6 (Magazine), at 37; Mann, supra note 42 at A23; Pollitt, supranote 42, at 697.

n44. KarlMarx & Fredrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1888), reprintedin The Marx-Engels Reader, at 475-78 (Robert C. Tucker ed., W.W. Norton &Co. 1978).

n45. SeeElizabeth S. Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993).

n46. SeeDavid Corn, Grading Free Trade, The Nation, Jan. 1, 1996, at 19("President Clinton declared 200,000 jobs would be added "by 1995alone' [as a consequence of NAFTA]. This fall, [economist Gary] Hufbauerestimated that the United States has suffered a net loss of 225,000 jobs underNAFTA. Multinational Monitor and Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, an earlyNAFTA opponent, recently surveyed sixty-six major U.S. corporations that hadclaimed the trade agreement would cause them to create jobs or expand imports;fifty-nine percent reported that their predictions have not come true.").

n47. Onethinks of the lament of doctors under managed care, or the laments about thedecline of the legal profession from a craft to a "mere" business.

n48. Onethinks of the now endless laments, and defenses, of "globalization,"which have become a hallmark of our time.

n49. Onethinks of the European Union.

n50.Cohen, supra note 1.

n51. KarlMarx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859),reprinted in The Marx-Engels Reader, at 3 (Robert C. Tucker ed., W.W. Norton& Co. 1978).

n52. P.69.

n53. P.278.

n54.Elster, supra note 12, at 106.

n55. Id.at 113.

n56. Forimportant critical discussion of this aspect of Cohen's argument, see JoshuaCohen, Book Review, 79 J. Phil. 253, 262-66 (1982).

n57. KarlMarx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (C. P. Dutt ed., InternationalPublishers 1935) (1852).

n58. Marx& Engels, supra note 44, at 473.

n59. Thisis the slogan suggested by G.A. Cohen's formulation of historical materialism;obviously, it is not a slogan Cohen or Marx actually employs.

n60.Elster, supra note 12, at 108. One can agree with Elster that it is notobvious, on its face, how the prospect of a more optimal development ofproductive forces would motivate people to act, while disagreeing that"collective action" presents a special obstacle in addition. It istrue that collective action looks paradoxical given the standard premises ofrational choice theory, but such premises are simply a priori dogma, on a parwith Hegelian dialectics in their indifference to empirical evidence! As Wolffcaustically notes: "The most casual survey of history and society shows usthat collective action is the norm in human affairs. In every human group onecan think of, collective action dominates the waking hours ... of every oneover the age of one and a half or two." Wolff, supra note 2, at 472. Thata particular a priori dogma makes that phenomenon puzzling ought, in rationaldiscourse, to count against the dogma! On the ideological peculiarities oflegal scholarship on this score, see Brian Leiter, Incommensurability: Truth orConsequences?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1727-1731 (1998).

n61. Cohen,supra note 1, at 292.

 

n62. AsCohen writes:

Sometimes, too, as in thegradual formation of capitalism, the capacity of a new class to administerproduction expresses itself in nascent forms of the society it will build,which, being more effective than the old forms, tend to supplant them.Purposive and competitive elements mingle as early growths of capitalismencroach upon and defeat feudal institutions that would restrict them.

  Id. at292-93.

n63. Id.at 148.

n64. Id.at 149.

n65. Theclassic discussion is Larry Wright, Teleogical Explanation (1976). Fordiscussion in the Marxian context, see Elster, supra note 12, at 31-34.

n66. Thisis merely an illustration; I am not claiming there is such a genetic basis forsucking.

n67. PeterRailton, Explanatory Asymmetry in Historical Materialism, 97 Ethics 233, 237(1986).

n68. Seesources cited supra note 37.

n69.Cohen, supra note 56, at 266.

n70. Seethe examples discussed in id. at 266-68.

n71. Id.at 271.

n72. P.102.

n73. P.103.

n74. P.103. There is an interesting question of Marx interpretation as to whether"equality" is, however, really one of those values. Cohen assumes itis throughout the book, without ever specifying what is meant by Marxianequality. At one point, he equates "Marxist equality" with the famousslogan from The Communist Manifesto: "From each according to his ability,to each according to his needs." But the latter seems a slogan thatcontemplates vast amounts of inequality, making the exact content of theMarxist commitment to equality even more puzzling.

Now, infact, it seems to me that Marx is committed to equality only in what is now thebanal sense accepted by all post-Enlightenment thinkers: namely, that in moraldeliberations, everyone's interests (well-being, dignity, autonomy, etc.)counts equally. I am not entitled to more or less moral consideration because Iam an American, or a male, or white. At this level, however, equality as adoctrine does not do much to discriminate among possible positions. After all,Kant is an egalitarian in this sense, as is the arch-utilitarian, Bentham. As amatter of Marxology, it seems to me that, in fact, equality is not a Marxianvalue at all - except in the banal sense just noted - whereas well-being (humanflourishing) is the central Marxian evaluative concept. Marx is a kind ofutilitarian not a deontological thinker, as Cohen's employment of the equalityrhetoric often suggests. Of course, Marx's view of well-being is a veryparticular (and Hegelian) one, and has nothing to do with desire-satisfaction,actual or idealized. But it is this implicit utilitarianism that would explainthe famous slogan from the Manifesto, "From each according to his ability,to each according to his need." Productive labor is part of the good life,according to Marx, and thus everyone is made better off by producing what theyare able to produce; yet no one can flourish unless their needs are met,independent of their ability to produce.

n75. Seetext accompanying notes 34-54 supra.

n76. P.112 (emphasis added).

n77. P.103.

n78. P.104.

n79. P.104.

n80. P.104.

n81. P.107-08.

 

n82. P.107.

n83. P.113.

n84. P.113-14.

n85. See,e.g., Joel E. Cohen, How Many People Can the Earth Support? (1995). Cohen wrylynotes that,

The Princeton demographerAnsley J. Coale observed that, in 1890 (when the U.S. population was 63million), most reasonable people would have considered it impossible for theUnited States to support 250 million people, its approximate population in1990; how would 250 million people find pasture for all their horses anddispose of all their manure?

  Id. at266; see also Doing the Numbers, The Nation, July 14, 1997, at 7 ("Fromthe annual U.N. Human Development Report: Delivering basic social services inall developing nations would cost $ 40 billion a year for ten years - less than0.2 percent of total world income; the net worth of ten billionaires is 1.5times the combined national income of the forty-eight poorestcountries.").

n86. P.112.

n87. P.109.

n88. P.117.

n89. KarlMarx, Theses on Feurbach (1845), reprinted in The Marx-Engels Reader, at 144(Robert C. Tucker ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1978).

n90. P.115.

n91. P.115.

n92. P.114.

n93. P.122.

n94. P.122.

n95. P.124.

n96. P.140.

n97. P.124.

n98.Nagel, supra note 23, at 5.

n99. P.141. This is Cohen's (fair) formulation of the Rawlsian doctrine. Forrepresentative Rawlsian formulations of the point, see John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 7, 54-55 (1971).

n100. P.140.

n101. P.130.

n102. P.149.

n103. P.150.

n104. P.153 (quoting David Lodge, Small World 127-29 (1984)). Note, of course, that thebasic point might hold - individual charity makes no difference to systemicchange - even without a commitment to dialectics or teleology.

n105.Oddly, he begins the discussion by considering the analogy between the richegalitarian, and the classical problem of akrasia, i.e., knowingly doing wrong(or knowingly failing to do what is good and right). Pp. 155-57. But thatpresupposes an affirmative answer to the question whether rich egalitarians areobligated to give away their money; for if they have no such obligation, thentheir failure to give away their money is not akratic. Since Cohen's ownconclusion is that some rich egalitarians may have arguments for staying rich,this discussion seems particularly ill-placed.

n106. Pp.158-59.

n107. P.163.

n108.Arguably, this would include Marx! See discussion supra note 74.

n109.Peter Singer, of course, is famous for trying to give utilitarian arguments forconclusions similar to Cohen's. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence andMorality, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 229 (1972). Few utilitarians are convinced,since the arguments tend to ignore the systemic implications of individualdecisions (about whether to keep money or give it to charity), but without anyexplanation of why such implications are not relevant from a utilitarianstandpoint.

n110. P.160.

n111. Pp.175-76.

n112. P.177.

n113.Nagel, supra note 23, at 6.

n114. Thepoint, remember, is about normative theories, not theories, per se. Marxplainly thinks that the theoretically correct understanding of historicalchange and capitalist development will have practical pay-offs in politicalorganizing and revolutionary activity. But Marx realizes one doesn't need anormative theory to convince the immiserated that they're miserable and oughtto do something about it. Marx, like Posner, assumes that normative theory willbe either ineffectual insofar as it conflicts with existing motivations, andotiose otherwise. Insofar as the immiserated are motivated to change things,Marx thinks his theory gives them the intellectual tools that will facilitatetheir revolutionary practice.

n115.Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions xii-xiii (1978).

n116. Id.at xiii.

n117. Seenote 6 supra and accompanying text.

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